This article investigates liquidity risk management by banks, which has gained significant importance since the global financial crisis of 2008. The issue is of particular interest for countries like Poland, in which foreign capital plays a dominant role. Such an ownership structure poses certain risks to the local banking sector, which faces an increased probability of the withdrawal of funding or assets’ transfers abroad in case of a crisis. Both these factors can have a detrimental influence on the liquidity position of foreign-owned banks and hence negatively affect the financial stability of the whole banking sector. The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of a dominating share of foreign investors in the Polish banking sector on the liquidity position of commercial banks. The study hypothesizes that the ownership structure of the Polish banking sector, in which there are banks predominantly controlled by foreign investors, does not pose a threat to the liquidity position of Polish banks. A supplementary research hypothesis is that the liquidity risk profile of foreign-owned banks differs from that of domestic banks. The sample consists of 14 foreign-owned banks and 5 domestic banks owned by local investors, which together constitute approximately 87% of the banking sector’s assets. The data covers the period of 2004–2014. The results of the regression models show no evidence of significant differences in terms of the dynamics of changes of the liquidity buffers between the foreign-owned and domestic banks, although the signs of the coefficients might suggest that the foreign-owned banks were decreasing the holdings of liquid assets at a slower pace over the examined period, compared to the domestic banks. However, no proof of the statistical significance of these findings has been found. The supplementary research hypothesis that the liquidity risk profile of foreign-controlled banks differs from that of domestic banks was rejected.
Most empirical studies have analyzed how liquidity risks faced by individual institutions turn into systemic risk. Recent banking crisis has highlighted the importance of grasping and controlling the systemic risk, and the acceptance by Central Banks to ease their monetary policies for saving default or illiquid banks. This last point shows that banks would pay less attention to liquidity risk which, in turn, can become a new important channel of loss. The financial regulation focuses on the most important and “systemic” banks in the global network. However, to quantify the expected loss associated with liquidity risk, it is worth to analyze sensitivity to this channel for the various elements of the global bank network. A small bank is not considered as potentially systemic; however the interaction of small banks all together can become a systemic element. This paper analyzes the impact of medium and small banks interaction on a set of banks which is considered as the core of the network. The proposed method uses the structure of agent-based model in a two-class environment. In first class, the data from actual balance sheets of 22 large and systemic banks (such as BNP Paribas or Barclays) are collected. In second one, to model a network as closely as possible to actual interbank market, 578 fictitious banks smaller than the ones belonging to first class have been split into two groups of small and medium ones. All banks are active on the European interbank network and have deposit and market activity. A simulation of 12 three month periods representing a midterm time interval three years is projected. In each period, there is a set of behavioral descriptions: repayment of matured loans, liquidation of deposits, income from securities, collection of new deposits, new demands of credit, and securities sale. The last two actions are part of refunding process developed in this paper. To strengthen reliability of proposed model, random parameters dynamics are managed with stochastic equations as rates the variations of which are generated by Vasicek model. The Central Bank is considered as the lender of last resort which allows banks to borrow at REPO rate and some ejection conditions of banks from the system are introduced.
Liquidity crunch due to exogenous crisis is simulated in the first class and the loss impact on other bank classes is analyzed though aggregate values representing the aggregate of loans and/or the aggregate of borrowing between classes. It is mainly shown that the three groups of European interbank network do not have the same response, and that intermediate banks are the most sensitive to liquidity risk.
There are three main ways of categorizing capital in banking operations: accounting, regulatory and economic capital. However, the 2008-2009 global crisis has shown that none of these categories adequately reflects the real risks of bank operations, especially in light of the failures Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers or Northern Rock. This paper deals with the economic capital allocation of global banks. In theory, economic capital should reflect the real risks of a bank and should be publicly available. Yet, as discovered during the global financial crisis, even when economic capital information was publicly disclosed, the underlying assumptions rendered the information useless. Specifically, some global banks that reported relatively high levels of economic capital before the crisis went bankrupt or had to be bailed-out by their government. And, only 15 out of 50 global banks reported their economic capital during the 2007-2010 period. In this paper, we analyze the changes in reported bank economic capital disclosure during this period. We conclude that relative shares of credit and business risks increased in 2010 compared to 2007, while both operational and market risks decreased their shares on the total economic capital of top-rated global banks. Generally speaking, higher levels of disclosure and transparency of bank operations are required to obtain more confidence from stakeholders. Moreover, additional risks such as liquidity risks should be included in these disclosures.